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> 谷歌这五年退出中国市场究竟损失了多少亿？
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【路之遥网讯】自2009年的谷歌李开复正式辞职事件以来，谷歌退出中国市场已长达五年之久，在这“漫长”的岁月之中，中国网名对其甚是想念，但俗话说得好“想念不如怀念”，因而谷歌一直没有卷土重来的意思。但近期Alphabet的动静似乎有“回来”的意思。
日消息，Google今日在其官方网站上发布了一篇名为《A new approach to China》的博文，在博文中，Google官方透露，将停止在中国过滤搜索结果。至此，Google退出了中国大陆市场，将服务器搬到了香港。
2010年谷歌将服务器由内地搬到香港后，在内地仍保留了约500人的团队继续负责技术开发和广告销售。据了解，尽管放弃了搜索市场，但是谷歌没有真正放弃内地庞大的用户群体，仍然利用谷歌的搜索引擎平台为内地企业投放面向国外市场的广告营销。2014年，谷歌在中国的广告收入达到了12亿人民币。
日前在北京举办的TrenCrunch国际创新峰会上，谷歌[微博]母公司、Alphabet执行主席施密特(EricSchmidt)公开表示，他此次来到中国的目的之一是希望能够和中国政府保持沟通，希望Google能够为中国提供服务。
如果说之前有关Google即将回归中国内地的消息还只是传言，那么此次施密特的表态无疑相当于谷歌自己证实了传言。而就在此几天前，谷歌的联合创始人谢尔盖·布林(SergeyBrin)也表示，谷歌在重组成为一家控股公司之后，一些子公司或许可以先于其他业务重返中国市场。
Google以年损失达50亿的代价退出中国市场。因而重返国内市场是大势所趋。今年4月，谷歌被爆出自2012年大量注册域名后再次注册多个与GooglePlay、 China有关的域名。紧接着，一幅与中国国旗图案相融合的GooglePlay图标在拆解新版GooglePlay.apk文件时被发现。虽然谷歌没有正面作出回应，但是接着和华为的合作让这场传言愈发甚嚣尘上。到此次施密特首次代表官方发声，谷歌意图返回中国内地市场已经板上钉钉。
eMarketer第一次在其数字广告调研报告中把搜索广告收入单列出来。eMarkerter预计，2015年全球（包括中国）花在搜索广告上的投入将达815.9亿美元，比2014年的701亿美元增长16.2%。
在这一笔总数中，预计今年谷歌的搜索广告收入将占总市场的54.5%。但是谷歌的广告收入没有一分钱是来自中国，而eMarketer预计中国2015年搜索广告收入将达到149亿美元。
如果谷歌能拿下中国市场份额的百分之十，这将是14亿美元。然而，谷歌一分钱都拿不到。
eMarketer在其报告中说：“谷歌退出中国，最大的受益者是百度，因为中国互联网用户数量巨大，而且在不断增长。”不能进入中国对Facebook等美国公司的影响越来越大，而且以后只会更明显。
因此，进军中国这块“奶酪”是大势所趋，不论谷歌承认与否，中国市场是必争之地，事关后续业务的成长。
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显然必须回来啊
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谷歌都淡出中国市场好久了，为啥改变策略了呢关注搜索引擎发展、透析搜索引擎原理、优化搜索引擎排名、分享、交流SEO技术
谷歌考虑退出中国市场 关闭Google.cn？
　　Google退出中国，真是不可思议的决定，居然要关闭Google.cn，Google考虑全面退出中国市场的原因源于Gmail在中国受到攻击和国内搜索过滤审查，只是觉得这两个原因比较可笑，Gmail受到攻击是很正常的事情，相信每天不知道有多少Gmail用户和其他Email用户邮箱被黑掉，不管用户是什么身份，不过黑客出于什么目的，无论哪个国家都存在这样的问题，同时对于搜索结果的过滤审查，这也是很正常的事情，每个国家都有自己的法律，遵纪守法是企业的责任，所以以上两个原因完全是扯蛋。真正的原因是来自美国政府的压力，从希拉里的言论可以看出来，真是替Google悲哀。
　　平时一般用Google，很少用百度，Google无疑是很好的工作帮手，像中英文结合或者英文的搜索，百度基本上失去了作用，像程序员、IT等技术人员以及高校学生和教师等科技工作者要查有用的资料基本上必须使用Google，Google还提供了Gmail,Google Docs，Google Reader，特别还有Google学者都是非常重要的工具。关键Google的退出，百度、搜狗、搜搜、有道、包括Bing至少目前都无法为上述人群提供有效的搜索，并不是Google不可或缺，但可以说影响巨大而深远。
　　根据最新易观国际的调查，Google 2009第4季度中国市场占有量达到35.8%，这么大的市场，说退出就退出？确实对不起那些多年来为Google奋斗的谷歌中国员工，对不起那些长期支持Google的上亿网民。很难想象百度一家独大的结果。失去中国市场的Google也就不能称之为全球最大搜索引擎，因为这里将是全球的最大市场。
　　个人觉得Google与政府部门应该多沟通，就像Google保持与站长的互动一样，在中国立足不仅仅靠技术，有很多东西已经是中国极具特色的文化，Google高层应该更多的了解中国文化，不要再混乱和冲动，11年Google折戟中国并不是什么光彩的事，重头再来只可能再次失败。
　　2010开年大剧就是、Google退出。
　　David Drummond, 谷歌高级副总裁、公司发展兼首席法律顾问1月13日关于英文原版。 &
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Google 为何退出中国大陆市场？
Eric Schmidt（Google前CEO）在他的书《How Google works》中讲到过这件事情。我刚刚翻出来看了一下。根据书中的内容，大概的时间线是：2004年年中，Google开始考虑进入中国市场。当时中国已有百度和雅虎在做搜索。Google当时已经发现中国的互联网有问题：上来自中国的搜索请求数有时候会突然掉到0，并且那些原本在Google上搜索的用户会被定向到百度的搜索结果页面。于是就会想到可能搞个会给中国用户更好的体验。尽管Sergey表示反对（与其家庭经历有关），但Google很快还是在北京设立了办公室，同时也按照政府的要求对搜索结果进行过滤。在按照政府的要求来进行过滤的那段时间，Google经常被要求屏蔽一些并没有明确违反任何已有法律的内容，有时甚至是某政府部门要求屏蔽另外一个政府部门发表的声明，有时还会是网上的一些谣传。比如CCTV的新大楼刚建好的时候，Google就被要求屏蔽与那幢楼相关的搜索关键字。年，Google中国的流量和收入都稳定增长。2009年12月，Google受到异常复杂并且目的明确的攻击。Sergey组织队伍进行对抗，发现攻击来自中国，目标是窃取Google的源代码，和某些用户的Gmail账户数据，其中包括某些human rights activists和political dissidents。日（周日）下午4点，Sergey在紧急召开的会议上提出不再过滤搜索结果，即使这可能导致被关闭，前几年在中国的努力付诸东流。 几个重量级人物原本的站队是Larry Eric（要）vs Sergey（不要）。但在这次事件后，Larry改主意了。当天晚上9点作出的决定：向公众公布这次黑客攻击事件的细节，并逐步停止上的内容过滤。1月11日（周一），Eric和董事会讨论决定。1月12日（周二），公开决定。之后Google试图和中国政府协商，但没有达成一致。2010年3月，逐步关闭的服务器。用户被重定向到感觉好像我的总结并不是很清楚。于是把重要的事情再列一下：进入中国之前：Eric：中国用户访问会被干扰。所以我们应该搞一个，同时直接配合中国政府的政策，这样能给中国用户更好的体验。Sergey：不行。我们不应该和中国政府发生任何关系。Larry：Eric说得对。于是就有了。2009年12月的事件之后：Sergey：非常坚定的表示，作为对攻击事件的回应，我们应该停止过滤上的结果。（“ Sergey forcefully made the argument that, as a response to the hacker attacks, we should stop complying with government censorship policies.” ）Larry：我觉得Sergey说得对。要不我们还是不过滤了。（在Sergey说服了Larry之后，其他人的意见，哪怕是Eric的，都已经不重要了。当时他们两人的投票权之和是超过半数的。）Eric：我想静静。本答案的所有内容都是书中原文的总结（以英文版为准），其中没有任何我的个人观点。考虑到我还在领着Google的工资，不管我说什么都有屁股决定脑袋的嫌疑，所以还是闭嘴比较好。如果我的总结有什么和原文不符的地方，欢迎指出。（↑抱歉的确有写的不大准确的地方……经提醒已经修改了）以下是原文节选。本书有简体中文（）和繁体中文译本。简体中文版对这一章内容有删节。如果喜欢请购买正版~Decisions—The True Meaning of ConsensusIn December 2009, we learned that Google was under attack from hackers. That we were under some form of attack wasn’t unusual, in fact it happened practically every day. But this time was different. The sophistication of the attack was something we hadn’t experienced before, and so was its objective. A criminal (or, more likely, team of criminals) had somehow found a way to access Google’s corporate servers. Up until then, most bad guys who attacked us were intent on disrupting Google’s services, to shut us down or make it harder for users to access us. This time the bad guys wanted our confidential information.Sergey immediately started working on stopping the attack and figuring out who was perpetrating it and how. In a matter of hours he formed a team of the smartest computer security experts he could find, and gathered them in a nondescript building near our Mountain View headquarters. Over the next couple of weeks, the team set up systems that ultimately allowed them to watch the attacks as they were in progress, and what they found was chilling. The hackers weren’t just stealing intellectual property, but were also trying to access Gmail accounts, including those of human rights activists. And the attacks originated from within the nation with the fastest-growing major economy in the world: China.It was about five and a half years earlier, in mid-2004, that we began to get involved in the Chinese market. From a business standpoint, entering China was not a controversial decision. China was (and is) a huge market, with more people than any other country, tens (now hundreds) of millions of Internet users, and an economy that was growing very quickly. There was a local competitor, Baidu, who had already developed a formidable presence in search, and Yahoo was also gaining momentum. Larry and Sergey visited the country and came away very impressed by all the innovation and energy they witnessed. They had always wanted to hire all the best engineers in the world, and a lot of those engineers were in China.But while the business indicators all pointed to a slam dunk decision to get involved, the don’t-be-evil indicators were much more mixed. Information did not flow freely across the Chinese Internet. We knew this from direct experience: On most days, Chinese citizens were allowed to access our US site, Google.com, and get its unfettered (albeit English) results. But occasionally, Chinese traffic would drop to zero, and people from China trying to get to
would instead be routed to Baidu (and its filtered results). Would opening up a localized site in China be better for the Chinese people, even if we would have to abide by local regulations, or would it make us complicit in the government’s censorship, something that ran counter to the essence of our company’s culture and values? Would establishing ourselves as a local business give us a chance to improve access to information and shed light on the questionable (and nontransparent) practices of the other search providers in China?From the get-go, Sergey Brin was squarely in the “stay out” camp. His family had immigrated to the United States from the Soviet Union when he was a child, so he had firsthand experience with Communist regimes and he didn’t want to support the one in China in any way. But many others on Eric’s staff disagreed, and the business factors—plus the hope of being able to change the information climate in China—tipped the scale in favor of entering. Sukhinder Singh Cassidy, who was running our Asia operations at the time, moved quickly, and within a few months established a Google China subsidiary. We set up a business office in Beijing, and we grudgingly decided to comply with local censorship regulations, but with a twist: We would inform users when results were being blocked. They couldn’t access the censored information, but at least they would be informed that censorship was occurring.One thing that surprised us was that many of the censorship requests we received were intended to suppress links to content that didn’t violate any clear, written law. Sometimes these requests were an attempt to mitigate spats between various government departments (one agency censoring the public statements of another agency) or to suppress scandals that had been planted online. For example, rumors started circulating that the sparkling new Beijing headquarters of CCTV (China Central Television) had a design based on rather salacious images. So we received, and complied with, a request to censor searches related to, among other things, CCTV, genitalia, and porn jokes. (And for all of you who just Googled those terms, (1) shame on you, and (2) we hope you’re not at work!)In January 2006, we launched our localized Chinese site, Google.cn, with in-country servers, and a few months later Eric visited Beijing to promote the site. During one of his press interviews he somehow ended up sitting directly below a framed picture of Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh. The US press, which was already ambivalent about Google entering China, had a field day with that one. But things went well after that inauspicious beginning: Our local engineers helped the product get much better, and traffic and revenue grew steadily between 2006 and the end of 2009.”With the hacking attacks, all that progress was suddenly in danger. Eric had always believed that engaging in China was not only the right business decision, but the right moral decision as well. While Sergey had always disagreed, Larry had sided with Eric. In light of the attacks, though, Larry was changing his mind. The behavior we were seeing was evil, he told Eric, and wasn’ in fact, the harassment would likely get worse. Eric agreed with this assessment, but was surprised that self-eviction was our answer. Both founders were now firmly against censoring our results on Google.cn.For leaders, decisions are when
there’s a reason why the word “tough” is so often followed by “decision.” (In recent decades it’s also often followed by “love,” but the implementation of that policy is beyond the sphere of this book.) Google’s decision to leave China was emblematic of how we reach decisions, how our process works. Formulating a strategy, hiring the right people, and creating a unique culture are all preliminaries to the fundamental activity of all businesses and business leaders: decision-making.Different institutions take different approaches to decision-making based on their hierarchical structure. The Marines (top-down) keep it simple: One guy gives the ord everyone else takes the hill. “Dammit, there’s only one guy in charge here so put on your helmet and get going.” Most big corporations (bureaucratic) have far more analyses to perform before they can decide the best course of action. Do they have all the data they need? Have the analysts crunched it? Did they calculate pro forma revenues and EBITDA?Weeks go by, the seasons change, and the hill stays before them, untaken. “M the hill is definitely one of our stretch goals.” And in the hip start-up (enlightened), the CEO proclaims that she works for the employees so decisions are made by consensus. “Everyone gets a say and the arguments are collegial, considerate, and last forever. “Let’s everyone go chillax, grab a cappuccino, and meet back here in a half hour to see where we stand, hill-wise.”So who’s right—top-down Marines, bureaucratic corporations, or enlightened start-ups? The pace of business change in the Internet Century dictates that decis the Marines win in that regard. More demanding and informed customers and increased competition dictate that they be as well
the corporations may have an edge there. And having a team of smart creatives dictates that hello, start-ups. So all of them are right, of course. And they are all wrong too.The answer lies in understanding that when it comes to making decisions, you can’t just focus on making the right one. The process by which you reach the decision, the timing of when you reach it, and the way it is implemented are just as important as the decision itself. Blow any of these, and the outcome will likely be negative. And since there’s always another decision to be made, the impact of a poorly executed decision-making process can reverberate past that one issue.As Sergey and his team continued their investigation throughout the latter part of December 2009, Eric knew that one of the most important decisions in the company’s history was at hand. Although he believed that staying in the China market was the best thing for the company, he also knew that both of the founders now disagreed with him. They no longer felt that our presence in the market was helping change government censorship practices, and didn’t want to participate in any way in that censorship. It would be an uphill battle to change their minds, so Eric’s focus shifted. It wasn’t just about making the best decision for the company, but about orchestrating the process so the company reached that decision in the best possible way. There would be other crises and other important decisions, and the smart creatives who populated his staff and ran the company would be paying attention to and learning from how this one was handled. It was especially challenging, given that he was reasonably confident he would disagree with the outcome.Sergey and his investigative team conclusively confirmed the origin and scale of the attack in early January, and the news was bad. Not only were the hackers trying to steal source code, they had also attempted to compromise the Gmail accounts of several Chinese political dissidents. Sergey felt it was important to announce the attack, and how Google would react, very quickly. There was little disagreement on that point. In Eric’s staff meeting that first week of January, Sergey forcefully made the argument that, as a response to the hacker attacks, we should stop complying with government censorship policies. He wanted us to stop filtering search results on Google.cn, even if it meant that the government would likely shut down the site, reversing much of our hard-won progress in the market. He stood up in the meeting
usually Sergey stands in meetings only when he’s wearing his Rollerblades. Eric was traveling that day and attending the meeting via video conference, so he counseled his team to consider all the data and come to the next meeting prepared to express and defend a position on what the company should do.Because of the urgency of the situation, Eric convened the next team meeting for the following Sunday afternoon—January 10, 2010—at four p.m. It started with Sergey conducting a detailed technical review of the situation for well over an hour. He then reiterated the position he had expressed earlier in the week: We should stop filtering our results. Eric knew that Larry was on Sergey’s side, which meant that the decision was effectively made. But it was critically important that all of the members of his team be heard and have a vote. Everyone would have to pull together and rally behind the decision, regardless of where they stood on the matter. So the meeting continued for several hours. We reviewed the facts and had a lengthy, sometimes heated discussion. Finally, Eric called for a vote. The sentiment in the room was clearly favoring Sergey’s position, and the vote wasn’t really necessary, but Eric felt it was important that each person get a chance to record his or her position. Some agreed with Eric that leaving China was tantamount to disengaging from that market for the next hundred years. The majority sided with Sergey, who believed that the Chinese government would eventually change their behavior because their current model would not be sustainable, leaving the door open at some point in the future for Google to reenter the market.The ultimate decision, which the weary team reached around nine p.m. that evening, wasn’t to pull out immediately. Rather, we would disclose the hacking attack with as much tran to the best of our knowledge, of the numerous companies that were affected, we were the only one to go public with the details. And we would announce our plans to stop censoring results on Google.cn. We would not make this change immediately, instead giving ourselves time to—as our lead attorney, David Drummond, put it in the blog post announcing the decision—“[discuss] with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all.” On Monday, Eric discussed the decision with the board, and on Tuesday, January 12, 2010, we announced it publicly.The morning we made the announcement, we got several calls from government officials to our Beijing office wondering if it was some sort of joke. No one does this, one of them told us. Everyone just leaves quietly.We were not leaving quietly. It was a public ultimatum, and Eric had complete clarity on what was going to happen. We would continue to talk with Chinese officials, to see if we could find a solution that was consistent with both our new public position and Chinese law, but that would fail. Google wouldn’t back down from its public stance, and China wouldn’t repeal its laws. So, as expected, in March we took the preordained step of shutting down search on Google.cn. Users visiting that page who tried to perform searches were directed to our site in Hong Kong, Google.com.hk. From that point on, Google search results would be subject to being blocked by the Great Firewall of China. Our traffic dropped precipitously.The TGIF of January 15, 2010, was dominated by discussion of the Chinese issue. Sergey and the security team presented in great detail what had happened, and reviewed the process by which the management team had made its decision. But before he could even get started, Googlers gave the entire senior team a long and thunderous standing ovation. The response from employees in China was of course very different. They feared for their jobs and even their security. Head of Engineering Alan Eustace, along with several dedicated team members in China, was instrumental in steering morale back on track, ensuring that the China team remained safe, engaged, and successful throughout that turbulent time. As a result, the legacy of the China decision was a giant dose of goodwill from Googlers around the world, and the legacy of the thoughtful process by which it was made was the reaffirmation of a set of principles governing how all tough decisions should be made.
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