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Nicomachean Ethics
By Aristotle
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Nicomachean Ethics
By Aristotle
Written 350 B.C.E
Translated by W. D. Ross
In all friendships between dissimilars it is, as we have said,
proportion that equalizes the parties and pres e.g.
in the political form of friendship the shoemaker gets a return for his
shoes in proportion to his worth, and the weaver and all other craftsmen
do the same. Now here a common measure has been provided in the form of
money, and therefore everything is referred to this
but in the friendship of lovers sometimes the lover complains that his
excess of love is not met by love in return though perhaps there is nothing
lovable about him), while often the beloved complains that the lover who
formerly promised everything now performs nothing. Such incidents happen
when the lover loves the beloved for the sake of pleasure while the beloved
loves the lover for the sake of utility, and they do not both possess the
qualities expected of them. If these be the objects of the friendship it
is dissolved when they do not get the things that formed the motives of
for each did not love the other person himself but the qualities
he had, and the that is why the friendships also are
transient. But the love of characters, as has been said, endures because
it is self-dependent. Differences arise when what they get is something
different and
for it is like getting nothing at all
when we do no compare the story of the person who
made promises to a lyre-player, promising him the more, the better he sang,
but in the morning, when the other demanded the fulfilment of his promises,
said that he had given pleasure for pleasure. Now if this had been what
each wanted, all
but if the one wanted enjoyment
but the other gain, and the one has what he wants while the other has not,
the terms of the association will not have bee for
what each in fact wants is what he attends to, and it is for the sake of
that that that he will give what he has.
But who is to fix the
he who makes the sacrifice
or he who has got the advantage? At any rate the other seems to leave it
to him. This is what they say P whenever he taught
anything whatsoever, he bade the learner assess the value of the knowledge,
and accepted the amount so fixed. But in such matters some men approve
of the saying 'let a man have his fixed reward'. Those who get the money
first and then do none of the things they said they would, owing to the
extravagance of their promises, naturally find themselves the objects of
for they do not fulfil what they agreed to. The sophists are
perhaps compelled to do this because no one would give money for the things
they do know. These people then, if they do not do what they have been
paid for, are naturally made the objects of complaint.
But where there is no contract of service, those who give up something
for the sake of the other party cannot (as we have said) be complained
of (for that is the nature of the friendship of virtue), and the return
to them must be made on the basis of their purpose (for it is purpose that
is the characteristic thing in a friend and in virtue). And so too, it
seems, should one make a return to those with whom one ha
for their worth cannot be measured against money, and they can get no honour
which will balance their services, but still it is perhaps enough, as it
is with the gods and with one's parents, to give them what one
If the gift was not of this sort, but was made with a view to a
return, it is no doubt preferable that the return made should be one that
seems fair to both parties, but if this cannot be achieved, it would seem
not only necessary that the person who gets the first service should fix
the reward, for if the other gets in return the equivalent
of the advantage the beneficiary has received, or the price lie would have
paid for the pleasure, he will have got what is fair as from the
We see this happening too with things put up for sale, and in some
places there are laws providing that no actions shall arise out of voluntary
contracts, on the assumption that one should settle with a person to whom
one has given credit, in the spirit in which one bargained with him. The
law holds that it is more just that the person to whom credit was given
should fix the terms than that the person who gave credit should do so.
For most things are not assessed at the same value by those who have them
and each class values highly what is its own and what
yet the return is made on the terms fixed by the receiver.
But no doubt the receiver should assess a thing not at what it seems worth
when he has it, but at what he assessed it at before he had
A further problem is set by such questions as, whether one should
in all things give the preference to one's father and obey him, or whether
when one is ill one should trust a doctor, and when one has to elect a
general should elect a m and similarly whether one
should render a service by preference to a friend or to a good man, and
should show gratitude to a benefactor or oblige a friend, if one cannot
All such questions are hard, are they not, to decide with precision?
For they admit of many variations of all sorts in respect both of the magnitude
of the service and of its nobility necessity. But that we should not give
the preference in all things to the same pe and we
must for the most part return benefits rather than oblige friends, as we
must pay back a loan to a creditor rather than make one to a friend. But
perhaps even thi e.g. should a man who has been ransomed
out of the hands of brigands ransom his ransomer in return, whoever he
may be (or pay him if he has not been captured but demands payment) or
should he ransom his father? It would seem that he should ransom his father
in preference even to himself. As we have said, then, generally the debt
should be paid, but if the gift is exceedingly noble or exceedingly necessary,
one should defer to these considerations. For sometimes it is not even
fair to return the equivalent of what one has received, when the one man
has done a service to one whom he knows to be good, while the other makes
a return to one whom he believes to be bad. For that matter, one should
sometimes not lend in return to one who for the one
person lent to a good man, expecting to recover his loan, while the other
has no hope of recovering from one who is believed to be bad. Therefore
if the facts really are so, th and if they are not,
but people think they are, they would be held to be doing nothing strange
in refusing. As we have often pointed out, then, discussions about feelings
and actions have just as much definiteness as their
subject-matter.
That we should not make the same return to every one, nor give
a father the preference in everything, as one does not sacrifice everything
to Zeus, but since we ought to render different things
to parents, brothers, comrades, and benefactors, we ought to render to
each class what is appropriate and becoming. And this is what people seem
to marriages they i for these have
a part in the family and therefore in the doings th
and at funerals also they think that kinsfolk, before all others, should
meet, for the same reason. And it would be thought that in the matter of
food we should help our parents before all others, since we owe our own
nourishment to them, and it is more honourable to help in this respect
the authors of our being e and honour too one should
give to one's parents as one does to the gods, but not
for that matter one should not give the same honour to one's father and
one's mother, nor again should one give them the honour due to a philosopher
or to a general, but the honour due to a father, or again to a mother.
To all older persons, too, one should give honour appropriate to their
age, by rising to receive them and finding seat while
to comrades and brothers one should allow freedom of speech and common
use of all things. To kinsmen, too, and fellow-tribesmen and fellow-citizens
and to every other class one should always try to assign what is appropriate,
and to compare the claims of each class with respect to nearness of relation
and to virtue or usefulness. The comparison is easier when the persons
belong to the same class, and more laborious when they are different. Yet
we must not on that account shrink from the task, but decide the question
as best we can.
Another question that arises is whether friendships should or should
not be broken off when the other party does not remain the same. Perhaps
we may say that there is nothing strange in breaking off a friendship based
on utility or pleasure, when our friends no longer have these attributes.
For it was of these attributes that and when these
have failed it is reasonable to love no longer. But one might complain
of another if, when he loved us for our usefulness or pleasantness, he
pretended to love us for our character. For, as we said at the outset,
most differences arise between friends when they are not friends in the
spirit in which they think they are. So when a man has deceived himself
and has thought he was being loved for his character, when the other person
was doing nothing of the kind, h when he has been
deceived by the pretences of the other person, it is just that he should
he will complain with more justice than
one does against people who counterfeit the currency, inasmuch as the wrongdoing
is concerned with something more valuable.
But if one accepts another man as good, and he turns out badly
and is seen to do so, must one still love him? Surely it is impossible,
since not everything can be loved, but only what is good. What is evil
neither can for it is not one's duty to be a lover
of evil, nor to bec and we have said that like is
dear like. Must the friendship, then, be forthwith broken off? Or is this
not so in all cases, but only when one's friends are incurable in their
wickedness? If they are capable of being reformed one should rather come
to the assistance of their character or their property, inasmuch as this
is better and more characteristic of friendship. But a man who breaks off
such a friendship would seem to be d for it was not
to a man of this sort
when his friend has changed,
therefore, and he is unable to save him, he gives him
But if one friend remained the same while the other became better
and far outstripped him in virtue, should the latter treat the former as
a friend? Surely he cannot. When the interval is great this becomes most
plain, e.g. in the case of
if one friend remained
a child in intellect while the other became a fully developed man, how
could they be friends when they neither approved of the same things nor
delighted in and were pained by the same things? For not even with regard
to each other will their tastes agree, and without this (as we saw) they
for they cannot live together. But we have discussed
these matters.
Should he, then, behave no otherwise towards him than he would
if he had never been his friend? Surely he should keep a remembrance of
their former intimacy, and as we think we ought to oblige friends rather
than strangers, so to those who have been our friends we ought to make
some allowance for our former friendship, when the breach has not been
due to excess of wickedness.
Friendly relations with one's neighbours, and the marks by which
friendships are defined, seem to have proceeded from a man's relations
to himself. For (1) we define a friend as one who wishes and does what
is good, or seems so, for the sake of his friend, or (2) as one who wishes
his friend to exist and live, which mothers do to their children,
and friends do who have come into conflict. And (3) others define him as
one who lives with and (4) has the same tastes as another, or (5) one who
grieves and rejo and this too is found in mothers
most of all. It is by some one of these characterstics that friendship
too is defined.
Now each of these is true of the good man's relation to himself
(and of all other men in so far as they t virtue and
the good man seem, as has been said, to be the measure of every class of
things). For his opinions are harmonious, and he desires the same things
and therefore he wishes for himself what is good and
what seems so, and does it (for it is characteristic of the good man to
work out the good), and does so for his own sake (for he does it for the
sake of the intellectual element in him, which is thought to be the man
himself); and he wishes himself to live and be preserved, and especially
the element by virtue of which he thinks. For existence is good to the
virtuous man, and each man wishes himself what is good, while no one chooses
to possess the whole world if he has first to become some one else (for
that matter, even now God possesses the good); he wishes for this only
on condition of
and the element that thinks would
seem to be the individual man, or to be so more than any other element
in him. And such a man wishes
for he does so with
pleasure, since the memories of his past acts are delightful and his hopes
for the future are good, and therefore pleasant. His mind is well stored
too with subjects of contemplation. And he grieves and rejoices, more than
any other, for the same thing is always painful, and the
same thing always pleasant, and not one thing at one time and another at
he has, so to speak, nothing to repent of.
Therefore, since each of these characteristics belongs to the good
man in relation to himself, and he is related to his friend as to himself
(for his friend is another self), friendship too is thought to be one of
these attributes, and those who have these attributes to be friends. Whether
there is or is not friendship between a man and himself is a question we
may dis there would seem to be friendship in so far
as he is two or more, to judge from the afore-mentioned attributes of friendship,
and from the fact that the extreme of friendship is likened to one's love
for oneself.
But the attributes named seem to belong even to the majority of
men, poor creatures though they may be. Are we to say then that in so far
as they are satisfied with themselves and think they are good, they share
in these attributes? Certainly no one who is thoroughly bad and impious
has these attributes, or even seems to do so. They hardly belong even to
for they are at variance with themselves, and have appetites
for some things and rational desires for others. This is true, for instance,
o for they choose, instead of the things they themselves
think good, things that are
while others again, through
cowardice and laziness, shrink from doing what they think best for themselves.
And those who have done many terrible deeds and are hated for their wickedness
even shrink from life and destroy themselves. And wicked men seek for people
with whom to spend their days, for they remember many
a grevious deed, and anticipate others like them, when they are by themselves,
but when they are with others they forget. And having nothing lovable in
them they have no feeling of love to themselves. Therefore also such men
do not rejoice or gr for their soul is rent by faction,
and one element in it by reason of its wickedness grieves when it abstains
from certain acts, while the other part is pleased, and one draws them
this way and the other that, as if they were pulling them in pieces. If
a man cannot at the same time be pained and pleased, at all events after
a short time he is pained because he was pleased, and he could have wished
that these things had not
for bad men are laden with
repentance.
Therefore the bad man does not seem to be amicably disposed even
to himself, because there is no so that if to be thus
is the height of wretchedness, we should strain every nerve to avoid wickedness
and should
for so and only so can one be either friendly
to oneself or a friend to another.
Goodwill is a friendly sort of relation, but is not identical with
for one may have goodwill both towards people whom one does
not know, and without their knowing it, but not friendship. This has indeed
been said already.' But goodwill is not even friendly feeling. For it does
not involve intensity or desire, whereas these accomp
and friendly feeling implies intimacy while goodwill may arise of a sudden,
as it does towards comp we come to feel goodwill for
them and to share in their wishes, but we would not d
for, as we said, we feel goodwill suddenly and love them only
superficially.
Goodwill seems, then, to be a beginning of friendship, as the pleasure
of the eye is the beginning of love. For no one loves if he has not first
been delighted by the form of the beloved, but he who delights in the form
of another does not, for all that, love him, but only does so when he also
longs for him when absent and cra so too it is not
possible for people to be friends if they have not come to feel goodwill
for each other, but those who feel goodwill are not
for they only wish well to those for whom they feel goodwill, and would
not do anything with them nor take trouble for them. And so one might by
an extension of the term friendship say that goodwill is inactive friendship,
though when it is prolonged and reaches the point of intimacy it becomes
friendship-not the friendship based on utility nor th
for goodwill too does not arise on those terms. The man who has received
a benefit bestows goodwill in return for what has been done to him, but
in doing so is onl while he who wishes some one to
prosper because he hopes for enrichment through him seems to have goodwill
not to him but rather to himself, just as a man is not a friend to another
if he cherishes him for the sake of some use to be made of him. In general,
goodwill arises on account of some excellence and worth, when one man seems
to another beautiful or brave or something of the sort, as we pointed out
in the case of competitors in a contest.
Unanimity also seems to be a friendly relation. For this reason
it is not for that might occur even with people who
do nor do we say that people who have the same views
on any and every subject are unanimous, e.g. those who agree about the
heavenly bodies (for unanimity about these is not a friendly relation),
but we do say that a city is unanimous when men have the same opinion about
what is to their interest, and choose the same actions, and do what they
have resolved in common. It is about things to be done, therefore, that
people are said to be unanimous, and, among these, about matters of consequence
and in which it is possible for both or all parties t
e.g. a city is unanimous when all its citizens think that the offices in
it should be elective, or that they should form an alliance with Sparta,
or that Pittacus should be their ruler-at a time when he himself was also
willing to rule. But when each of two people wishes himself to have the
thing in question, like the captains in the Phoenissae, they are in a state
for it is not unanimity when each of two parties thinks of
the same thing, whatever that may be, but only when they think of the same
thing in the same hands, e.g. when both the common people and those of
the better class wish
for thus and thus alone do
all get what they aim at. Unanimity seems, then, to be political friendship,
as indeed it is for it is concerned with things that
are to our interest and have an influence on our life.
Now such unanimity is
for they are unanimous
both in themselves and with one another, being, so to say, of one mind
(for the wishes of such men are constant and not at the mercy of opposing
currents like a strait of the sea), and they wish for what is just and
what is advantageous, and these are the objects of their common endeavour
as well. But bad men cannot be unanimous except to a small extent, any
more than they can be friends, since they aim at getting more than their
share of advantages, while in labour and public service they fall short
and each man wishing for advantage to himself criticizes
his neighbour a for if people do not watch it carefully
the common weal is soon destroyed. The result is that they are in a state
of faction, putting compulsion on each other but unwilling themselves to
do what is just.
Benefactors are thought to love those they have benefited, more
than those who have been well treated love those that have treated them
well, and this is discussed as though it were paradoxical. Most people
think it is because the latter are in the position of debtors and the former
and therefore as, in the case of loans, debtors wish their
creditors did not exist, while creditors actually take care of the safety
of their debtors, so it is thought that benefactors wish the objects of
their action to exist since they will then get their gratitude, while the
beneficiaries take no interest in making this return. Epicharmus would
perhaps declare that they say this because they 'look at things on their
bad side', but it is qui for most people are forgetful,
and are more anxious to be well treated than to treat others well. But
the cause would seem to be more deeply rooted in
the case of those who have lent money is not even analogous. For they have
no friendly feeling to their debtors, but only a wish that they may kept
safe with a view to what is while those who have done
a service to others feel friendship and love for those they have served
even if these are not of any use to them and never will be. This is what
happen every man loves his own handiwork better than
he would be loved by and this happens perhaps most
for they have an excessive love for their own poems,
doting on them as if they were their children. This is what the position
of for that which they have treated well is their
handiwork, and therefore they love this more than the handiwork does its
maker. The cause of this is that existence is to all men a thing to be
chosen and loved, and that we exist by virtue of activity (i.e. by living
and acting), and that the handiwork is in a sense, the
he loves his handiwork, therefore, because he loves existence. And this
is rooted in
for what he is in potentiality, his
handiwork manifests in activity.
At the same time to the benefactor that is noble which depends
on his action, so that he delights in the object of his action, whereas
to the patient there is nothing noble in the agent, but at most something
advantageous, and this is less pleasant and lovable. What is pleasant is
the activity of the present, the hope of the future, the memory of the
but most pleasant is that which depends on activity, and similarly
this is most lovable. Now for a man who has made something his work remains
(for the noble is lasting), but for the person acted on the utility passes
away. And the memory of noble things is pleasant, but that of useful things
is not likely to be pleasant, though the reverse seems true
of expectation.
Further, love is like activity, being
loving and its concomitants are attributes of those who are the more
Again, all men love more what the e.g. those
who have made their money love it more than those w
and to be well treated seems to involve no labour, while to treat others
well is a laborious task. These are the reasons, too, why mothers are fonder
of their c bringing them into the world costs them
more pains, and they know better that the children are their own. This
last point, too, would seem to apply to benefactors.
The question is also debated, whether a man should love himself
most, or some one else. People criticize those who love themselves most,
and call them self-lovers, using this as an epithet of disgrace, and a
bad man seems to do everything for his own sake, and the more so the more
wicked he is-and so men reproach him, for instance, with doing nothing
of his own accord-while the good man acts for honour's sake, and the more
so the better he is, and acts for his friend's sake, and sacrifices his
own interest.
But the facts clash with these arguments, and this is not surprising.
For men say that one ought to love best one's best friend, and man's best
friend is one who wishes well to the object of his wish for his sake, even
and these attributes are found most of all
in a man's attitude towards himself, and so are all the other attributes
by which for, as we have said, it is from this relation
that all the characteristics of friendship have extended to our neighbours.
All the proverbs, too, agree with this, e.g. 'a single soul', and 'what
friends have is common property', and 'friendship is equality', and 'charity
begins at home'; for all these marks will be found most in a man's relation
he is his own best friend and therefore ought to love himself
best. It is therefore a reasonable question, which of the two views we
for both are plausible.
Perhaps we ought to mark off such arguments from each other and
determine how far and in what respects each view is right. Now if we grasp
the sense in which each school uses the phrase 'lover of self', the truth
may become evident. Those who use the term as one of reproach ascribe self-love
to people who assign to themselves the greater share of wealth, honours,
for these are what most people desire, and busy themselves
about as though they were the best of all things, which is the reason,
too, why they become objects of competition. So those who are grasping
with regard to these things gratify their appetites and in general their
feelings and the irrational and most men are of this
nature (which is the reason why the epithet has come to be used as it is-it
takes its meaning from the prevailing type of self-love, which is a bad
one); it is just, therefore, that men who are lovers of self in this way
are reproached for being so. That it is those who give themselves the preference
in regard to objects of this sort that most people usually call lovers
for if a man were always anxious that he himself, above
all things, should act justly, temperately, or in accordance with any other
of the virtues, and in general were always to try to secure for himself
the honourable course, no one will call such a man a lover of self or blame
But such a man would seem more than the o
at all events he assigns to himself the things that are noblest and best,
and gratifies the most authoritative element in and in all things obeys
and just as a city or any other systematic whole is most properly
identified with the most authoritative element in it, and
therefore the man who loves this and gratifies it is most of all a lover
of self. Besides, a man is said to have or not to have self-control according
as his reason has or has not the control, on the assumption that this is
and the things men have done on a rational principle are
thought most properly their own acts and voluntary acts. That this is the
man himself, then, or is so more than anything else, is plain, and also
that the good man loves most this part of him. Whence it follows that he
is most truly a lover of self, of another type than that which is a matter
of reproach, and as different from that as living according to a rational
principle is from living as passion dictates, and desiring what is noble
from desiring what seems advantageous. Those, then, who busy themselves
in an exceptional degree with noble actions all me
and if all were to strive towards what is noble and strain every nerve
to do the noblest deeds, everything would be as it should be for the common
weal, and every one would secure for himself the goods that are greatest,
since virtue is the greatest of goods.
Therefore the good man should be a lover of self (for he will both
himself profit by doing noble acts, and will benefit his fellows), but
the w for he will hurt both himself and his neighbours,
following as he does evil passions. For the wicked man, what he does clashes
with what he ought to do, but what the good man for
reason in each of its possessors chooses what is best for itself, and the
good man obeys his reason. It is true of the good man too that he does
many acts for the sake of his friends and his country, and if necessary
for he will throw away both wealth and honours and in general
the goods that are objects of competition, gaining
since he would prefer a short period of intense pleasure to a long one
of mild enjoyment, a twelvemonth of noble life to many years of humdrum
existence, and one great and noble action to many trivial ones. Now those
who die for others doubtles it is therefore a great
prize that they choose for themselves. They will throw away wealth too
on condition that their fr for while a man's friend
gains wealth he himse he is therefore assigning the
greater good to himself. The same too is true
these things he will sac for this is noble and laudable
for himself. Rightly then is he thought to be good, since he chooses nobility
before all else. But he may even give up a it may
be nobler to become the cause of his friend's acting than to act himself.
In all the actions, therefore, that men are praised for, the good man is
seen to assign to himself the greater share in what is noble. In this sense,
then, as has been said, a man shoul but in the sense
in which most men are so, he ought not.
It is also disputed whether the happy man will need friends or
not. It is said that those who are supremely happy and self-sufficient
hav for they have the things that are good, and therefore
being self-sufficient they need nothing further, while a friend, being
another self, furnishes what a man cannot provi whence
the saying 'when fortune is kind, what need of friends?' But it seems strange,
when one assigns all good things to the happy man, not to assign friends,
who are thought the greatest of external goods. And if it is more characteristic
of a friend to do well by another than to be well done by, and to confer
benefits is characteristic of the good man and of virtue, and it is nobler
to do well by friends than by strangers, the good man will need people
to do well by. This is why the question is asked whether we need friends
more in prosperity or in adversity, on the assumption that not only does
a man in adversity need people to confer benefits on him, but also those
who are prospering need people to do well by. Surely it is strange, too,
to make the supremely
for no one would choose the
whole world on condition of being alone, since man is a political creature
and one whose nature is to live with others. Therefore even the happy man
for he has the things that are by nature good. And plainly
it is better to spend his days with friends and good men than with strangers
or any chance persons. Therefore the happy man needs
What then is it that the first school means, and in what respect
is it right? Is it that most identify friends with useful people? Of such
friends indeed the supremely happy man will have no need, since he already
nor will he need those whom one makes one's
friends because of their pleasantness, or he will need them only to a small
extent (for his life, being pleasant, has no need of adventitious pleasure);
and because he does not need such friends he is thought not to need
But that is surely not true. For we have said at the outset that
happ and activity plainly comes into being and is
not present at the start like a piece of property. If (1) happiness lies
in living and being active, and the good man's activity is virtuous and
pleasant in itself, as we have said at the outset, and (2) a thing's being
one's own is one of the attributes that make it pleasant, and (3) we can
contemplate our neighbours better than ourselves and their actions better
than our own, and if the actions of virtuous men who are their friends
are pleasant to good men (since these have both the attributes that are
naturally pleasant),-if this be so, the supremely happy man will need friends
of this sort, since his purpose is to contemplate worthy actions and actions
that are his own, and the actions of a good man who is his friend have
both these qualities.
Further, men think that the happy man ought to live pleasantly.
Now if he were a solitary, life w for by oneself it
is not easy to be but with others and towards others
it is easier. With others therefore his activity will be more continuous,
and it is in itself pleasant, as it ought to be for the man who is supremely
for a good man qua good delights in virtuous actions and is vexed
at vicious ones, as a musical man enjoys beautiful tunes but is pained
at bad ones. A certain training in virtue arises also from the company
of the good, as Theognis has said before us.
If we look deeper into the nature of things, a virtuous friend
seems to be naturally desirable for a virtuous man. For that which is good
by nature, we have said, is for the virtuous man good and pleasant in itself.
Now life is defined in the case of animals by the power of perception in
that of man by the power of p and a power is defined
by reference to the corresponding activity, which is
therefore life seems to be essentially the act of perceiving or thinking.
And life is among the things that are good and pleasant in themselves,
since it is determinate and the determinate is of th
and that which is good by nature is also good for the virtuous man (which
is the reason why life seems pleasant to all men); but we must not apply
this to a wicked and corrupt life nor to
a life is indeterminate, as are its attributes. The nature of pain will
become plainer in what follows. But if life itself is good and pleasant
(which it seems to be, from the very fact that all men desire it, and particularly
those who are good for to such men life is most desirable,
and their existence is the most supremely happy) and if he who sees perceives
that he sees, and he who hears, that he hears, and he who walks, that he
walks, and in the case of all other activities similarly there is something
which perceives that we are active, so that if we perceive, we perceive
that we perceive, and if we think, and if to perceive that
we perceive or think is to perceive that we exist (for existence was defined
as perceiving or thinking); and if perceiving that one lives is in itself
one of the things that are pleasant (for life is by nature good, and to
perceive what is good present in oneself is pleasant); and if life is desirable,
and particularly so for good men, because to them existence is good and
pleasant for they are pleased at the consciousness of the presence in them
of what is in itself good); and if as the virtuous man is to himself, he
is to his friend also (for his friend is another self):-if all this be
true, as his own being is desirable for each man, so, or almost so, is
that of his friend. Now his being was seen to be desirable because he perceived
his own goodness, and such perception is pleasant in itself. He needs,
therefore, to be conscious of the existence of his friend as well, and
this will be realized in their living together and sharing in discussion
for this is what living together would seem to mean in the
case of man, and not, as in the case of cattle, feeding in the same
If, then, being is in itself desirable for the supremely happy
man (since it is by its nature good and pleasant), and that of his friend
is very much the same, a friend will be one of the things that are desirable.
Now that which is desirable for him he must have, or he will be deficient
in this respect. The man who is to be happy will therefore need virtuous
Should we, then, make as many friends as possible, or-as in the
case of hospitality it is thought to be suitable advice, that one should
be 'neither a man of many guests nor a man with none'-will that apply to
should a man neither be friendless nor have an excessive
number of friends?
To friends made with a view to utility this saying would seem thoroughly
for to do services to many people in return is a laborious
task and life is not long enough for its performance. Therefore friends
in excess of those who are sufficient for our own life are superfluous,
and hindranc so that we have no need of them. Of friends
made with a view to pleasure, also, few are enough, as a little seasoning
in food is enough.
But as regards good friends, should we have as many as possible,
or is there a limit to the number of one's friends, as there is to the
size of a city? You cannot make a city of ten men, and if there are a hundred
thousand it is a city no longer. But the proper number is presumably not
a single number, but anything that falls between certain fixed points.
So for friends too there is a fixed number perhaps the largest number with
whom one can live together (for that, we found, thought to be very characteristic
of friendship); and that one cannot live with many people and divide oneself
up among them is plain. Further, they too must be friends of one another,
if they are all to spend and it is a hard business
for this condition to be fulfilled with a large number. It is found difficult,
too, to rejoice and to grieve in an intimate way with many people, for
it may likely happen that one has at once to be happy with one friend and
to mourn with another. Presumably, then, it is well not to seek to have
as many friends as possible, but as many as are enough for the purpose
for it would seem actually impossible to be a great
friend to many people. This is why one cannot love
is ideally a sort of excess of friendship, and that can only be felt towards
therefore great friendship too can only be felt towards a few
people. This seems to be c for we do not find many
people who are friends in the comradely way of friendship, and the famous
friendships of this sort are always between two people. Those who have
many friends and mix intimately with them all are thought to be no one's
friend, except in the way proper to fellow-citizens, and such people are
also called obsequious. In the way proper to fellow-citizens, indeed, it
is possible to be the friend of many and yet not be obsequious but a genuinely
but one cannot have with many people the friendship based on
virtue and on the character of our friends themselves, and we must be content
if we find even a few such.
Do we need friends more in good fortune or in bad? They are sought
for while men in adversity need help, in prosperity they
need people to live with and to make the objects
for they wish to do well by others. Friendship, then, is more necessary
in bad fortune, and so it is useful friends that on
but it is more noble in good fortune, and so we also seek for good men
as our friends, since it is more desirable to confer benefits on these
and to live with these. For the very presence of friends is pleasant both
in good fortune and also in bad, since grief is lightened when friends
sorrow with us. Hence one might ask whether they share as it were our burden,
or-without that happening-their presence by its pleasantness, and the thought
of their grieving with us, make our pain less. Whether it is for these
reasons or for some other that our grief is lightened, is a question that
at all events what we have described appears to take
But their presence seems to contain a mixture of various factors.
The very seeing of one's friends is pleasant, especially if one is in adversity,
and becomes a safeguard against grief (for a friend tends to comfort us
both by the sight of him and by his words, if he is tactful, since he knows
our character and the things that please or pain us); but to see him pained
at our mi for every one shuns being a cause of pain
to his friends. For this reason people of a manly nature guard against
making their friends grieve with them, and, unless he be exceptionally
insensible to pain, such a man cannot stand the pain that ensues for his
friends, and in general does not admit fellow-mourners because he is not
himse but women and womanly men enjoy sympathisers
in their grief, and love them as friends and companions in sorrow. But
in all things one obviously ought to imitate the better type of
On the other hand, the presence of friends in our prosperity implies
both a pleasant passing of our time and the pleasant thought of their pleasure
at our own good fortune. For this cause it would seem that we ought to
summon our friends readily to share our good fortunes (for the beneficent
character is a noble one), but summon them to our bad fort
for we ought to give them as little a share as possible in our evils whence
the saying 'enough is my misfortune'. We should summon friends to us most
of all when they are likely by suffering a few inconveniences to do us
a great service.
Conversely, it is fitting to go unasked and readily to the aid
of those in adversity (for it is characteristic of a friend to render services,
and especially to those who are in need and ha such
action is nobler and pleasanter for both persons); but when our friends
are prosperous we should join readily in their activities (for they need
friends for these too), but be tardy in coming forward to be the objects
for it is not noble to be keen to receive benefits.
Still, we must no doubt avoid getting the reputation of kill-joys by repulsing
for that sometimes happens.
The presence of friends, then, seems desirable in all
circumstances.
Does it not follow, then, that, as for lovers the sight of the
beloved is the thing they love most, and they prefer this sense to the
others because on it love depends most for its being and for its origin,
so for friends the most desirable thing is living together? For friendship
is a partnership, and as a man is to himself, so now
in his own case the consciousness of his being is desirable, and so therefore
is the consciousness of his friend's being, and the activity of this consciousness
is produced when they live together, so that it is natural that they aim
at this. And whatever existence means for each class of men, whatever it
is for whose sake they value life, in that they wish to occupy themselves
and so some drink together, others dice together, others
join in athletic exercises and hunting, or in the study of philosophy,
each class spending their days together in whatever th
for since they wish to live with their friends, they do and share in those
things which give them the sense of living together. Thus the friendship
of bad men turns out an evil thing (for because of their instability they
unite in bad pursuits, and besides they become evil by becoming like each
other), while the friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their
and they are thought to become better too by their activities
for from each other they take the mould of
the characteristics they approve-whence the saying 'noble deeds from noble
men'.-So much, then, our next task must be to discuss}